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IN SEARCH OF TRADITION: GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH
INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1863, Abraham Lincoln sat in his train on the
way to Gettysburg.' As he contemplated the speech he was about to give,
he surely realized that he was "giving people a new past to live with"
when he "altered [the Constitution] from within, by appeal from its letter
to the spirit."2 Yet the lawyer in Lincoln might have been surprised to see
the ways in which he was about to change the nation beyond the imme-
diate struggle for union and emancipation.3  The Gettysburg Address
would be in large part the foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
From that text, much of the Bill of Rights was applied to the states. 5 A
right to contract would be discovered, and then discarded.6 A right to
privacy would be found, limiting the states' abilities to interfere with a
7
person's choices of contraception, abortion, and marriage.
This Comment addresses Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,8 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' response to same-
sex couples seeking marriage licenses. Part I gives the facts and proce-
dural history of the case, and Part II provides background to put Good-
ridge in its historical context. Part III summarizes the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV suggests that the court did not ad-
dress the true issue presented by the case, which is whether laws prohib-
iting same-sex marriage should receive the strict judicial scrutiny that
accompanies a fundamental right, and argues that strict scrutiny is the
proper standard.9 This Comment concludes that protecting same-sex
marriage as a fundamental right is in fact consistent with American his-
tory and tradition.
1. GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG, 29-30 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
2. Id. at 38.
3. For an in-depth analysis of the Gettysburg Address, see WILLS, supra note I.
4. Id.; see generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
414-15 (Foundation Press 2001) (discussing the origins of the Civil War Amendments).
5. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
8. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
9. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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I. FACTS OF GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
During a five-week period beginning in March 2001, numerous
same-sex couples applied for marriage certificates in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.' As required by General Laws c. 207 (hereinafter
"G.L. c. 207"), the couples presented their "completed notices of inten-
tion to marry ... forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk, together
with the required health forms and marriage license fees."" The parties
agreed that all of the facial requirements necessary to receive the licenses
were met. 
12
In all cases, the marriage licenses were denied "on the ground[s]
that Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriage."' 3 In re-
sponse, plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 11, 2001, alleging "the ex-
clusion of the [p]laintiff couples and other qualified same-sex couples
from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil
marriage, as well as the protections, benefits and obligations of marriage,
violate[d] Massachusetts law." 14 Each side sought summary judgment.15
The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Common-
wealth. 16 The judge held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage and accordingly applied rational basis review.' 7 He found that
plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated under such a standard.
1 8
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court considered the con-
solidated case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Fundamental Rights Doctrine
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health unfolds in the context of
the debate that has continued since the nation's inception: does the Con-
stitution offer only the protections that it specifically states, or are there
rights not enumerated that enjoy similar protections? 20 The early discus-
sion is well captured in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull. 21 Justice Chase
wrote: "There are certain vital principles in our free Republican Gov-
ernment, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant
abuse of legislative power ... an ACT . . . (for I cannot call it a law)
10. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
11. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 949-50.





17. Id. at 951.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 960.
20. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452.
21. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
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contrary to [this] principle ... cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority." 22 Justice Chase's position drew on the idea of natu-
ral law, viewing "a written constitution not as the initial source [of a law]
but as a reaffirmation of a social compact preserving pre-existing funda-
mental rights-rights entitled to protection whether or not they were ex-
plicitly stated in the document. 2 3 Dissenting in Calder, Justice Iredell
stated: "Some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against
natural justice must, in itself, be void ... , [however] the ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have
differed on the subject ... ,24
Justice Chase's ideas had origins within the highest tradition of
English Law. 5 Sir William Blackstone had written: "Thus, when the
Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing,
he impressed certain principles upon that matter ... so, when he created
man .. he laid down certain immutable laws . . . and gave him the fac-
ulty of reason to discover the purport of those laws." 26 Winston Churchill
described the views of Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke in a similar way:
"Coke himself was reluctant to admit that law could be made, or even
changed. It existed already, merely awaiting revelation and expostula-
tion.
, ,9 7
The debate continued upon enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868. The initial case law took a narrow approach similar to Jus-
tice Iredell's, viewing the Fourteenth Amendment as merely having a
purpose to end slavery and ensure racial equality.28 For example, initial
attempts at the Incorporation Doctrine, whereby the Bill of Rights was
applied to the states, failed. 29 In The Slaughter-House Cases, Justice
Miller wrote:
When the effect [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is to fetter and de-
grade the state governments by subjecting them to control of Con-
gress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to
them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when it in fact
radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the state and
federal governments to each other and of both these governments to
the people; the argument [opposing such a view] has a force that is ir-
resistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose
too clearly to admit of doubt. We are convinced that no such results
22. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
23. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452.
24. Calder, 3 U.S. at 398-99 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
25. JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 216 (Little, Brown and Co.
1943).
26. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE ENGLISH LAW § II, at 38-40 (Grigg
Duyckink Long Collins, Chitty ed., 1827).
27. 2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 125 (Dodd,
Mead & Co. 1956).
28. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
29. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 36.
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were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments,
nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.
30
An examination of the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment
supports Justice Miller:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
3
1
There is no language contained in this amendment that expresses a
purpose of changing the relationship between State and Federal govern-
ment "too clearly to admit of doubt.,
32
Yet as time passed, law not in the text would be discovered "by ap-
peal from its letter to the spirit.' 33 In Lochner v. New York,34 the Court
indicated a willingness to move past a literal interpretation of the word
"liberty" in the Due Process Clause.35 The Court held that liberty created
a fundamental right to contract, and the state of New York was not al-
36lowed to interfere with labor contracts. Justice Holmes' dissenting
comment that "The Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics"37 would eventually prevail, and the right to
38contract is no longer considered fundamental. However, other cases
would emerge that applied Lochner's broad concept of liberty to other
rights that were considered fundamental.39 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 ° the
court invalidated a mandatory sterilization law, holding that the right to
procreate was fundamental.4 ' In Meyer v. Nebraska,42 the Court ex-
panded on these rights, stating: "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to.. . engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
30. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 78.
33. WILLS, supra note 1, at 38; Lawrence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental
Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1938 (2004); see generally
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 452 (discussing the rise of substantive due process).
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
36. Id.; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
37. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics was an economic
treatise advocating a laissez-faire approach that was popular at the turn of the century. Id.
38. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4 (detailing the end of the Lochner
regime); Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
39. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 508-594 (discussing the evolution
of the fundamental rights doctrine); Tribe, supra note 33, at 1938.
40. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
41. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-43.
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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to the dictates of his own conscience .... Justice Goldberg stated the
evolving view in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut:'
"[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights which are funda-
mental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights...
there are additional fundamental rights which exist alongside those...
specifically mentioned." 45 As this line of jurisprudence developed, the
Court would hold that fundamental rights included the right to control
one's body46 and mind,47 the right to travel,48 to marry,49 to vote,5" and
perhaps most controversially, the right to privacy.5 !
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,52 which used this
privacy right, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty," to protect a woman's right to an abortion. Although lim-
ited to abortion, "Roe has proved to be key to subsequent decisions not
limited to reproductive rights. 53 Nineteen years later, the Court ex-
panded on Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,54 holding that traditions
"afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. '55
In 2003, the Court indicated the broadest protection yet, holding in
Lawrence v. Texas5 6 that a state may not criminalize same-sex sodomy
and that the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and privacy
protect "freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct . . .beyond spatial bounds [of the home]. 57 In dissent, Justice
Scalia noted that as a result of the holding, "laws against ... same-sex
marriage . . . [are] called into question."58 The Goodridge plaintiffs
agreed.59
43. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.
47. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
48. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964).
49. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
50. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,639 (1993).
51. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
52. Roe, 410U.S. at 113.
53. Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights Not Moral Opin-
ions, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 345, 345 (2004).
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
56. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
58. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960.
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B. The Impact of the Fundamental Rights Doctrine on Legislation
A judicial by-product of the fundamental rights doctrine is the vary-
ing standards of review by which the Court reviews legislation. 6° When a
fundamental right is present, the Court uses "strict judicial scrutiny"; a
law must have a "compelling goal" and be "narrowly tailored" toward
that goal.61 Absent a fundamental right, the Court uses "rational basis" or
"minimum rationality" review; a law must only have a "legitimate goal"
and be "rationally related" toward that goal.62 The naming of a standard,
"a point somewhere on the spectrum from minimum rationality to per se
prohibition in order to signal the appropriate level of judicial deference
* . . the legislature should expect, is a recent addition to the Court's
methodology 64 It is often criticized as being more "conclusory than in-
formative," 65 leaving commentators to suggest that it "has not shown
itself worthy of being enshrined as a permanent fixture in the armament
of constitutional analysis.
' 66
Worthy or not, varying levels of judicial scrutiny might be here to
stay; sometimes it is harder to put jurisprudential genies back in the bot-
tles whence they came than the more magical kind.67 Clearly, an entire
case can turn on the presence of a fundamental right.68 Goodridge should
have.
69
III. GOODRIDGE V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH70
A sharply divided court issued the opinion.71 The majority held that
there was no rational reason to treat same-sex couples differently than
opposite-sex couples.72 Accordingly, the majority held that Massachu-
setts could not exclude same-sex partners from receiving marriage li-
censes.73 Justice Greaney concurred with the result but wrote separately
to indicate that he believed the decision should have been reached by
applying a higher level of judicial scrutiny.74 Justices Spina, Sosman, and
60. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1916; see generally Lynn Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitu-
tional Claims for Same Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 14, 28 (discussing the impact of strict
scrutiny).
61. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960,976.
62. Id. at 983.
63. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1916.
64. Id. at 1916-17.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally id. (commenting on the merits of varying levels of judicial review).
68. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); see generally Wardle, supra note
60 (discussing the impact of strict scrutiny).
69. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); see generally Wardle, supra note
60.
70. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
71. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
72. Id. at 948.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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Cordy each wrote separate dissents. 5 Justice Spina argued that the court
had taken on a legislative role.76 Justice Sosman suggested that the court
had misapplied the minimum rationality standard." Justice Cordy wrote
that the opinion ignored the fact that the traditional definition of marriage
was "between a man and a woman. 78 Each dissenting justice joined the
dissents of the other two.
7 9
A. The Majority Opinion: Applying Rational Basis Review
Chief Justice Marshall announced the opinion of the court, which
was joined by Justices Ireland and Cowin.80 The court recognized that
legislative intent, along with history and tradition, defined marriage as a
"union between a man and woman."8' Nevertheless, noting the impor-
tance of marriage in a community, and the many benefits that flow only
to married couples, the court held that to deny same-sex partners a mar-
riage license violated their rights under the Massachusetts Constitution.82
As Articles 1, 7, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution draw lan-
guage from the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the opinion relied heavily on federal Constitutional case law.
83
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the legislative ration-
ales offered by the state: "(1) providing a favorable setting for procrea-
tion; (2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the depart-
ment defines as a two-parent family with one parent of each sex; and (3)
preserving scarce State and private financial resources." 84 Ultimately, the
court found that there was no rational relationship between these goals
and the policy of excluding same-sex partners from receiving a marriage
license. 85 Therefore, the majority declined to reach the issue of whether
75. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
76. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id. at 948.
81. Id. at 952.
82. Id. at 968-70.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 961.
85. Id. at 948. Pointing out that the rationality review is not "toothless," id. at 960, the court
noted:
If total deference to the Legislature were the case, the judiciary would be stripped of its
constitutional authority to decide challenges to statutes pertaining to marriage, child rear-
ing, and family relationships, and, conceivably, unconstitutional laws that provided for
the forced sterilization of habitual criminals; prohibited miscegenation; required court
approval for the marriage of persons with child support obligations; compelled a pregnant
unmarried minor to obtain the consent of both parents before undergoing an abortion; and
made sodomy a criminal offense, to name just a few, would stand.
Id. at 966 n.31.
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same-sex marriage was a fundamental right demanding strict scrutiny.
86
The decision of the Superior Court was vacated.87
B. Justice Greaney's Concurrence: Laws Prohibiting Same-Sex Mar-
riage Should Receive Heightened Scrutiny
Justice Greaney filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with both the
outcome and the remedy. 88 However, he suggested that a fundamental
rights analysis was the correct approach to the case: "The withholding of
relief from the plaintiffs, who wish to marry, and are otherwise eligible
to marry, on the ground that the couples are of the same gender, consti-
tutes a categorical restriction of a fundamental right.",89 Accordingly, he
advocated the strict scrutiny that accompanies such a right.90 He further
noted that given the fact that marriage is "the cornerstone of our social
structure, as well as the defining relationship in our personal lives,"
9'
none of the state's rationales for interpreting G.L. c. 207 to exclude
same-sex partners were sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scru-
tiny.92
Justice Greaney also argued that interpreting G.L. c. 207 to exclude
same-sex partners was an equal protection violation of both the federal
and state Constitutions based on sex.9 3 He disagreed with those who sug-
gested that there was no gender discrimination at all, pointing out:
"Hillary Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge because she (Hillary)
is a woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry Richard Linnell
because he (Gary) is a man." 94
C. The Dissents: Courts Should Not Act As A Legislative Body
The dissents attempted to discredit the majority opinion by pointing
out its lack of deference to the legislature, the total lack of scientific evi-
dence considered, and the majority's misapplication of the minimum
rationality standard. 95 These justices also suggested that there was no
right to same-sex marriage, fundamental or not.
96
Justice Spina dissented on the grounds that the court had usurped
the responsibilities of the legislature. He wrote "What is at stake in this
86. Id. at 961.
87. Id. at 969.
88. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
89. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
90. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 973 n.5 (Greaney, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
96. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting);
id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
97. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
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case is not the unequal treatment of individuals or whether individual
rights have been impermissibly burdened, but the power of the Legisla-
ture to effectuate social change without interference from the courts. 98
Justice Sosman dissented, arguing that the majority had misapplied
the rational basis standard.99 He additionally objected to the lack of atten-
tion given to scientific study, noting that "studies to date reveal that there
are still some observable differences between children raised by oppo-
site-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples."
100
Finally, Justice Cordy dissented on the grounds that the very defini-
tion of marriage was "a union between a man and woman," and that
when the majority held this to be "merely conclusory," it was a "seman-
tic sleight of hand."'' While acknowledging that a classification based
on sex should receive heightened review, he disagreed with Justice Gre-
aney that this was such a case, based on the idea that people of neither
sex were prohibited from marrying a person of the opposite sex.'
0 2
IV. ANALYSIS
This analysis suggests that the Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health court did not address the true issue presented by the case, which
is whether laws prohibiting same-sex marriage should receive the strict
judicial scrutiny that accompanies a fundamental right. 10 3 Section (A)
explains why the court was incorrect when it chose the rational basis
standard of review.i °4 Section (B) maintains that this standard was incor-
rectly applied. 0 5 Section (C) argues that same-sex marriage should be
analyzed as a fundamental right,' °6 by demonstrating that the true tradi-
tion at issue is the fundamental right of controlling "choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 07 Section (D) concludes by ap-
plying the strict scrutiny that would accompany such a right.
A. Choosing Rational Basis Review
By choosing rational basis review, the Goodridge court used the
wrong standard. 10 8 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'0 9 the United States Supreme
98. Id. at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Sosman, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
103. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring).
104. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
106. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1945.
107. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
108. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting); see Karen Loewy, The Unconstitutionality Of Excluding Same-Sex
Couples From Marriage, 38 NEw ENG. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2004).
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Court held that "Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, funda-
mental to our very existence and survival."11  The Court confirmed in
Loving v. Virginia'11 that marriage is a fundamental right, "one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness." 12 And
in Zablocki v. Redhail,"3 the Court held that marriage is "part of the
'fundamental right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' 1 4 Yet the Goodridge court held that because "no
fundamental right or 'suspect' class is at issue here ... rational basis is
the appropriate standard of review."" 5 Despite citing language that con-
firms that marriage is a fundamental right, it proceeded to hold: "The
right to marry is different from rights deemed fundamental for equal pro-
tection and due process purposes . . .116 If the court is referring to tradi-
tional marriage, this is an incorrect statement of the law." 7 If the court is
referring to same-sex marriage, it is undermining the legal foundation of
its conclusion. 118 The opinion is replete with language, and rests on the
principle, that same-sex partners applying for marriage licenses should
be treated no differently than opposite-sex partners. 119 Loving, Zablocki
and Skinner dictate that laws restricting opposite-sex marriage receive
strict scrutiny.
120
Certainly, state law may provide greater protection to its citizens
than does the federal Constitution.' 21 The Goodridge court noted that
"Fundamental to the vigor of our Federal system of government is that
,state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions
to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provi-
sions of the United States Constitution."' 22 However, a state may not
provide less protection than the federal Constitution mandates. 23 In other
words, federal cases "set the floor.. . but not the ceiling."' 24 Since the
court held that same-sex and opposite-sex couples should be treated the
same, it was bound by federalism to apply strict scrutiny.
125
109. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)) (internal citations omitted).
111. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
112. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
113. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
114. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
115. Id. at 961.
116. Id. at 957.
117. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney,
J., concurring).
118. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); id. at 983 (Cordy, J, dissenting).
119. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
120. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
121. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995).
122. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. at 7).
123. Loewy, supra note 108, at 556.
124. Id. at 558.
125. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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The Goodridge court concluded that Massachusetts' ban did not
survive rational basis review for either due process or equal protection. 2
6
Accordingly, the court did not consider plaintiffs' arguments that the
case merited strict judicial scrutiny.127 Undoubtedly, if a law fails rational
basis review, afortiori it fails strict scrutiny. 28 If G.L. c. 207 truly failed
rational basis review, the choice of the wrong standard would be irrele-
vant. 129 However, as demonstrated below, G.L. c. 207 should in fact
withstand rational basis review, leaving the question of whether it would
survive strict scrutiny unanswered. 1
30
B. Applying Rational Basis Review
The court asked the wrong question when it applied the rational ba-
sis test.13' The real question under that test is not whether excluding
same-sex marriages will achieve the goals set forth by the state, but
whether it might.132 While it is true that the rational basis test is "not
toothless," it is the lowest standard of judicial review; a statute will
survive if it addresses a legitimate state goal, and a rational legislator
could think that the statute might advance the goal.
134
Since "[t]he rational basis standard applied under the Massachusetts
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution is the same," federal case law illustrates the point well. 135 In Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical,136 Justice Douglas confirmed that the mere theo-
retical possibility that a law would advance a goal was sufficient to with-
stand rational basis review. 137 He wrote:
The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions
when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regula-
tion .... The legislature might have concluded that one was needed
often enough to require one in every case. Or the legislature may
have concluded that eye examinations were so critical . .. that every
change should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical ex-
126. Id. at 941.
127. Id. at 961.
128. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Greaney, J., concurring).
131. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greancy, J., concurring).
133. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 960.
134. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978
(Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting); id. at 972
(Greaney, J., concurring).
135. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
136. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
137. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
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pert. The law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional.' 
38
The first legislative rationale in Goodridge is that marriage provides
a "favorable setting for procreation."' 39 The majority held that it failed
minimum rationality because "[t]he consummation of a marriage by coi-
tion is not necessary to its validity," and "impotency does not render a
marriage void, but only voidable at the suit of the party conceiving him-
self or herself to be wronged."'' 40 This argument misses the point. 141 Just
because some married people may not have children does not mean that
marriage is not a "favorable setting for procreation."'' 4 2 If it might be
such a setting, G.L. c. 207 survives rational basis review.
143
The second legislative rationale is "ensuring the optimal setting for
child rearing."' 144 The court simply stated: "The 'best interests of the
child standard' does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation or marital
status."' 145 Yet, as noted in Justice Sosman's dissent, for several thousand
years, there has been a popular opinion that living in a home with a
mother and father is in fact the optimal setting for a child. 146 This does
not mean that this belief is necessarily true, but it does mean that it
would not be irrational for a legislator to think that it is true.147 That is all
that the standard requires. n4
The third legislative rationale is "preserving scarce State and private
financial resources."'149 The court's contention that "an absolute statutory
ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational relationship to the goal of
economy"' 50 is somewhat undermined by the extensive list of state bene-
fits that are denied single people:
[J]oint Massachusetts income tax filing; entitlement to wages owed
to a deceased employee [public employees]; preferential options un-
der the Commonwealth's pension system; preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program; access to veterans' spousal bene-
fits and preferences; financial protections for spouses of certain
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
140. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (citing Franklin v. Franklin, 28 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1891) and
Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294 (Mass. 1919)); Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
141. Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
142. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
143. Id. at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney,
J., concurring); Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
144. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
145. Id. at 963.
146. Id. at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting); William C. Duncan,
The State Interests In Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 158 (2004).
147. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see Duncan, supra note 146, at
157.
148. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 961.
150. Id. at 964.
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Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers, and prose-
cutors, among others) killed in the performance of duty).'l
5
It is arguably bad, mean-spirited policy to save money by denying
certain people the right to marry, but it is not irrational to think that it
will save money. 1
52
C. Considering Fundamental Rights
1. In Search of Tradition
The true issue of this case is the question the Goodridge court left
unanswered: whether marriage is a fundamental right for same-sex as
well as opposite-sex couples. 53 A right is considered fundamental if it is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'' 54 Discerning such
tradition is a treacherous endeavor. 55 In the history of marriage, many
practices have been sustained over long periods of time, later to be re-
jected as wrong.156 Although the practices became traditions, they have
no place in a fundamental rights analysis.
157
The ancient common law Right of Coverture stated that a husband
had the sole right to control his wife's real property, and that he was the
true owner of his wife's personal property.' 8 For centuries, a wife could
not sue her husband based on the common law idea that "a husband and
wife are one, and he is the one."'159 The Goodridge court noted the tradi-
tional inequity between husband and wife:
Thus, one early Nineteenth Century jurist could observe matter of
factly that, prior to the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, 'the
condition of a slave resembled the connection of a wife with her hus-
band, and of infant children with their father. He is obliged to main-
tain them, and they cannot be separated from him.
'160
John Winthrop confirmed this view, stating a "husband is [a wife's]
lord, and she is to be subject to him ... a true wife would not think her
condition safe and free but in her subjection to her husband's author-
151. Id. at 955; Loewy, supra note 108, at 559.
152. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concur-
ring).
153. Id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
154. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
155. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937; see generally Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery and Same-
sex Marriage; On Legal Analysis and Fundamental Rights, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 313 (1998)
(discussing traditions in relation to a fundamental rights analysis).
156. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; see generally Strasser, supra note 155.
157. See generally Strasser, supra note 155.
158. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
159. Chief Justice Joseph R. Greenhill, Remarks at the memorial service for Justice James P.
Hart, Texas Supreme Court (Apr. 25, 1988) (commenting on Worden v. Worden, 224 S.W.2d 187
(Tex. 1949)); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
160. Goodridge 798 N.E.2d at 967 (citing Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)).
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ity."'16 1 The law did not allow interracial marriage in many states before
Loving. 162 Yet in 1780 the law allowed future Chief Justice John Mar-
shall to marry 14-year-old Mary Ambler.
1 63
Each of the unfortunate practices above has been "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history,"' 64 but is not a fundamental right. 165 Perhaps the
most distilled expression of the folly of blindly relying on tradition was
observed by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1897: "It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV.
' 66
If the task of weeding out practices not properly part of a search for
fundamental rights is difficult, harder yet is the task of conceiving the
whole of what is left; to avoid seeing the "dots but not the path that
passes through them." 167 Various members of the Court have insisted on
the dots only, finding a fundamental right by determining which "activi-
ties belong to the historically venerated catalog of privileged acts and
which do not." 168  In Washington v. Glucksberg,169 Justice Rehnquist
wrote that a fundamental right existed only if it could be found in a
"careful description" of "concrete example[s]" throughout history. 7 In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,'7 ' Justice Scalia stated that "we refer to the
most specific level at which a[n] . . . asserted right can be identified.
General traditions provide imprecise guidance. .. [and] a rule of law that
binds neither by text nor any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule
of law at all."'
172
Many voices fall into this trap over same-sex marriage; they search
in vain for a specific tradition of same-sex marriage, missing the true
tradition that is right in front of them. 73 Dissenting in Lawrence v.
Texas, in which he noted that the door to same-sex marriage was now
open, Justice Scalia observed that surely a thing that was once criminal
cannot be considered a fundamental right:
161. JOHN WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630-1649 228-30 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co. 1853).
162. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
163. 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LtFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 151 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1916).
164. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
165. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 991 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see generally Strasser, supra note
155 (discussing traditions in relation to a fundamental rights analysis).
166. Greg Bailey, Blackstone in America: Lectures by an English Lawyer Become a Blueprint
for a New Nation's Laws and Leaders, The Early American Review, at http://earlyamerica.com/
review/spring97/blackstone.htm (March 8, 2005).
167. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1936-37.
168. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1924.
169. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
170. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23; see also Tribe, supra note 33, at 1924.
171. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
172. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
173. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
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Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in
the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in pri-
vate and between consenting adults. Against this background, to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' is, at best, facetious.
174
This misses the rather obvious point that in 1868, it was also illegal
for whites and African-Americans to marry, illegal for women to vote,
and for all but three years of the nation's history, African-Americans
were property. 175 Each of these examples today would violate a funda-
mental right. 176 Dissenting in Goodridge, Justice Spina followed the ex-
ample of Justice Scalia: "Same-sex marriage is not 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history,' . . . same-sex marriage is not a right, fundamental or
otherwise, recognized in this country."'177 Finding same-sex marriage
absent from the history books, Justices Spina and Scalia declared it not a
part of our tradition.
178
Sir William Blackstone taught that a judge reveals, rather than
makes the law. 179 In revealing a tradition, it is more important to consider
the principles that emerge, rather than the combination of facts of indi-
vidual cases.180 To view traditions as a list of specific acts is to endanger
"not just ... substantive due process but also ... the nature of liberty
itself." 81 Justice Harlan noted this truth in his concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut:'82 "[T]radition is a living thing. The full scope of liberty...
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of specific guarantees
... . Liberty is not a set of isolated points . . . but a rational contin-
uum."'' 83 Lawrence Tribe provides the example that "[i]f the liberty
174. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 596 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192-94 (1986)).
175. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958, 967; John G. Culhane, Uprooting The Arguments Against
Same Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1165 (1999); Strasser, supra note 155, at 319
(discussing Justice Scalia's test for a fundamental rights analysis).
176. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Culhane, supra note 175, at
1165; Strasser, supra note 155, at 319; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
177. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Spina, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596; see generally Tribe, supra note 33
(arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of specific acts).
179. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, § I, at 38-40.
180. See Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937. The article offers a detailed discussion of the impor-
tance of seeing the principles that connect the cases rather than facts that make up the individual
cases. Id.
181. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1923.
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
claimed by the dying patients in Glucksberg184 could be flattened into an
ostensible 'right' to an overdose of some barbiturate, then the claim in
the flag-burning cases ... could be flattened into a putative right to set
fire to a painted cloth." 85 Reduced to its basic facts, a fundamental right
can be read out of any act.
18 6
Each case that supports the plaintiffs in Goodridge can be distin-
guished.187 Meyer v. Nebraska was about education, 188 and Skinner dealt
with sterilization.1 89 Griswold was about contraception, 90 and Roe v.
Wade about abortion. 191 Zablocki192 and Loving193 concerned the right to
marry, not redefining it. 194 Lawrence was a case about private acts, not a
demand for a government issued license.
195
But the principle that unifies these precedents is the true tradition at
issue; the inherent right of people to control "choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy." 196 This idea is stated ably by Justice O'Connor in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State. 1
97
Goodridge is "no more a case about a fundamental right" to same-
sex marriage than Loving "was a case about a fundamental right" to in-
terracial marriage, or Bowers "was a case about a 'fundamental right to
sodomy.' 198 Laws restricting same-sex marriage deserve to be held to
strict judicial scrutiny, because they implicate the fundamental right of
184. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702 (holding that Washington's prohibition against assisted
suicide does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment).
185. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1923-24.
186. Id.
187. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
188. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535.
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
191. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
192. 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
193. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
194. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
195. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 986 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
196. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
197. Id.
198. Wardle, supra note 60, at 43 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 at 192-94
(1986)); see generally Tribe, supra note 33 (arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of
specific acts).
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controlling "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which]
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
2. The Traditions from which America Broke
The right to define one's own concept of life, free from the compul-
sion of the state, is not only "deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition." 2°° It is the defining characteristic of the American experi-
ence.20' This becomes evident when one examines "the traditions from
which [America] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. 20 2 Neither tradition can be understood without the presence of the
other.20 3 The European tradition from which the American settlers broke
used the compulsion of a person's identity as an organizing principle.2°
This principle was so pervasive that it could be found in the religious,
intellectual, social and economic realities of Seventeenth Century Euro-
205pean life. In every way, people's identities were dictated to them the
moment they were born.
20 6
a. Religious and Intellectual Compulsion
The right to control one's identity by way of religious and intellec-
tual freedom was not granted to Seventeenth Century Europeans.2 7 In
England, James I and Charles I carried on the persecution of Catholics
that had started the moment Henry VI1 withdrew from the church.20 8
The Test Act provided that no Catholic could hold office. 209 James I had
Unitarians burned alive for doubting the divinity of Christ.2 '0 William
Prynne had his ears cut off for publishing Histriomatrix, a series of blas-
phemous plays.21' Jews had not been allowed in the country since the
time of Edward 1.212 After the ascension of Oliver Cromwell in 1642, the
control of the Puritans substituted itself for the control of the Church of
England.213 Gambling and betting were outlawed, and adultery was pun-
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951.
200. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
201. Id. at 503-04.
202. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
203. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
204. See generally WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF REASON (Simon & Schuster 1961)
[hereinafter DURANT I] (offering an in depth analysis of the relationship between government poli-
cies and private life in seventeenth century Europe).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. CHURCHILL, supra note 27, at 150-5 1.
208. Id. at 151-52.
209. WILL & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF LOUtS XIV 291 (Simon & Schuster 1963) [hereinaf-
ter DURANT I1].
210. DURANT I, supra note 204, at 140.
211. Id. at 193.
212. CHURCHILL, supra note 27, at 315.
213. Id. at 312.
20041
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ishable by death.214 Drinking, swearing, walking on the Sabbath, and
athletic sports were also banned.2 15
If things improved under William and the Glorious Revolution of
1688, it was not as much as is popularly believed.216 The Toleration Act
was passed in 1689, but tolerance did not extend to Catholics, Unitarians,
Jews, and Pagans.2 17 Dissenters were not allowed to attend university and
21could not seek elective office. 18 In 1697, the strengthened legislature
passed a law against blasphemy mandating prison for criticism of the
church.21 9 In 1699, laws were passed imposing life imprisonment for
saying mass, and rewards were waiting for those who turned in viola-
tors. 2 A person not taking a loyalty oath to the Church of England lost
the right to purchase or devise land.22 1 Even Locke's Epistola de Toler-
antia, urging tolerance as a principle, excluded atheists, Moslems, Catho-
lics and Unitarians.222 On the continent, the same situation existed.223
224
Jews had been expelled from Spain and Portugal, the Huguenots com-
pelled to leave France, and the Pietists unwelcome in Germany.225
If a person were fortunate enough to find a secular government that
would tolerate dissent, the church, which often acted as a sacred gov-
ernment, may not have been so understanding.2 26 The parents of the phi-
losopher Spinoza, expelled from Spain and Portugal, found refuge in
Holland.2 27 Spinoza's heretical beliefs were tolerated by the Dutch gov-
228emnment. Yet that which the government allowed, the church elders
would not; Spinoza was expelled from the synagogue for his beliefs. 29
Other churches were equally intolerant. On February 26, 1616, Galileo
was forced to appear before Urban VIE to recant his Copernican theories
published in De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium.230 Feeling that the
connection between his head and body was but tenuous, he spoke the
words: "With a sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and de-
test the said errors and heresies ....,,23. The idea of defining one's con-
214. ld. at 311-12.
215. Id.
216. DURANT II, supra note 209, at 301-02.
217. Id. at 301, 589.
218. Id. at 301-02.
219. Id. at 302.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 589-90.
223. Louis M. HACKER, THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION 17 (Columbia Univer-
sity Press 1947).
224. WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 162 (Simon & Schuster 1926) [hereinafter
DURANT Ill].
225. HACKER, supra note 223, at 17.
226. See DURANT I, supra note 224 at 167 (recounting the excommunication of Spinoza).
227. Id. at 162.
228. Id. at 167.
229. Id.
230. DURANT 1, supra note 204, at 607-08.
231. Id. at 610.
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cept of life free from government compulsion must have seemed very far
away.
b. Economic Compulsion
Economic life offered no greater freedom.232 The economic world
into which people were born was the world where they lived and died,
and where their children lived and died.233 In England, wages were stag-
234nant by law, fixed since 1585 by the Statute of Apprentices. The wages
averaged around one shilling a day, yet life's essentials were as expen-
sive in 1685 as they would be 200 years later.235 Any attempt to increase
pay would result in harsh penalties for employers and employees alike.236
Not only how much a person was paid, but also who worked, was dic-
tated by government policy; the freedom to make employment decisions
was restricted by the Statute of Laborers.
237
238The situation elsewhere in Europe was no better. In France, rem-
nants of the feudal system remained as late as the mid-18th Century.
239
As little as two percent of landowners outside of the noble class or the
church owned land franc-alleu, or "free from feudal dues." 24° Up to one
million people were still bound in literal serfdom. 241 These peasants were
"adscripti glebae (bound to the soil). '242 They had no legal rights to de-
vise or sell land--one of the primary ways of building wealth for a fam-
243ily over generations. So onerous were the taxes owed that survival was
lucky; improvement was impossible.244 These "legal, feudal and guild
hindrances" controlled people's economic identities.245 Will Durant notes
that "It was in this clamor of entrepreneurs to be freed from legal and
moral restraints that the modem ideology of liberty began."24
232. DURANT IL supra note 209, at 257-58.
233. Id. at 258.
234. Id. at 257-58.
235. Id. at 258.
236. Id. at 257-58.
237. WILLIAM HARLAN HALE, THE MARCH OF FREEDOM 37 (Harper & Brothers 1947).







244. Id. at 259-60.
245. DURANT n, supra note 209, at 258.
246. Id.
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c. Social Compulsion
The ability to shape one's identity by social class was equally lim-
ited.247 The family into which a person was born defined his social class
for life.248 Regardless of how much talent a person might possess, or how
hard a person might work, a lower class crib meant a lower class coffin.
In addition, such accidents of birth were determinative in the profes-
sional options open to a person.249 Access to office was determined not
by talent, but according to the identity of one's parents.250 James VI of
Scotland had nothing more to recommend him as Elizabeth's successor
than bloodline. 25 The House of Lords was (and is) equally blind to merit.
Even faculty appointments at universities were determined by parent-
252age. At the anatomical division of the University of Edinburgh, the
hereditary reign of the Monro dynasty lasted 126 years.253 No one who
had a different name needed to apply.254 Inevitably, talent was dissipated
over subsequent generations, and it was noted that in comparison to Pro-
fessors Monro primus and secondus, Professor Monro tertius was "also,
,,255but not likewise.
3. The Tradition from which America Developed
256
From all this the settlers fled. The specific reasons were different,
covering the spectrum from religious to economic, from social to politi-
cal, but in common was the freedom they sought to define their lives free
from government compulsion. 257 In almost every way, the old world had
said 'this is who you are;' the new world would allow people to say 'this
is who I am.'
258
a. Legal Foundations
The natural law theories of John Locke provided an intellectual and
legal framework. 259 Although Locke's Two Treatises on Government2 60
had been intended as a defense of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, gen-
erations of settlers drew on his ideas freely. 261 In this view of the world,










256. DURANT I, supra note 204, at 158.
257. Id.
258. See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMs (2001) (discussing the attitudes of
colonial Americans).
259. MILLER, supra note 25, at 170.
260. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (George Routledge & Sons 1884).
261. MILLER, supra note 25, at 170.
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"there was a state of nature in which men enjoyed complete liberty.
' 262
Government existed only to ensure that people be free to control their
own lives.263 Created by "God and Nature," these natural freedoms of
mankind to control his own life could not be restricted by govern-
ments.264 These ideas drew heavily from the philosophy of Coke and
Blackstone, which later supplied authority for Justice Chase in Calder v.
Bull.26 5 Upon this solid footing, the unifying principle of the colonies
was that people had a natural right to make decisions defining their lives
free from government compulsion.266
That the ideas of Locke, Coke and Blackstone are in fact "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history" is further evidenced by an examination of
political rhetoric over the years. Locke's ideas on the limited nature of
government were echoed by Charles Pinckney, who believed that gov-
ernment existed to ensure that citizens received the "blessings of civil
and religious liberty" that were their due.26 7 The notion of pre-existing
law espoused by Blackstone and Coke was confirmed by notable voices
at the Constitutional Convention.268 Thomas Jefferson wrote: "We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. '269 George Mason
suggested that "all men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent natural rights.., among which are the enjoyment of life
and liberty. 270 Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson agreed that "All
men are, by nature equal and free. ,,271 One hundred and eighty five
years later, John F. Kennedy confirmed that "[T]he rights of man come
not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.' 272 Within
this framework, the American nation evolved.
b. Religious and Intellectual Freedom
One manifestation of the idea that people were free to define their
own concept of life free from the compulsion of the state was that colo-
nial Americans were free to form their own religious identity without
government compulsion.273 To be sure, it was not an instant success; the
settlers brought strains of the virus with the antidote.274 The Puritans of
262. Id.
263. Id. at 170-71.
264. Id. at 171.
265. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
266. MILLER, supra note 25, at 171.
267. PAGE SMITH, THE SHAPING OF AMERICA 78 (1980).
268. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 121.
269. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
270. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 121.
271. Id.
272. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
273. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GREAT REPUBLIC 31-32 (Random House 1956).
274. Id. at 31.
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Massachusetts were as oppressive as their English counterparts. 275 The
Salem witch trials were onerous by European medieval standards. Bap-
tists were persecuted in Virginia and North Carolina.276 But the historical
line that culminated in the separation of church and state and freedom of
speech reached back to 1636, when Roger Williams set up the colony of
Rhode Island.277 Winston Churchill notes that Rhode Island was "the
only centre at that time in the world where there was complete religious
toleration. '" 278 This historical path traveled through Jefferson's Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty, stating in part:
Be it enacted by the general assembly, that no man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his re-
ligious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess...
their opinion in matters of religion .... 279
This historical trend culminated in the First Amendment, ensuring
freedom of both religion and speech.28° People would be free to hold and
express sacred and secular views free from government compulsion.28'
c. Social Freedoms
A second manifestation of the idea that people should define their
own concept of life free from the compulsion of the state was that colo-
282nial Americans were free from the hereditary constraints of Europe.
The idea that a person's social identity was formed, and professional
identity limited, at the moment of birth was anathema to the idea of
America.283 Jefferson believed in a "natural aristocracy" based on "merit
and talent" rather than a hereditary one based on "connections and influ-
ence. '' 2m John Adams used the phrase "natural aristocracy" in a similar
way in his Defence of the Constitutions.2 85 The founders believed these
ideas so strongly that Article I of the Constitution forbids citizens from
receiving titles of nobility.286 Even the title by which the President would
be addressed received close attention; most members thought it impor-
275. Id.
276. MILLER, supra note 25, at 194.
277. CHURCHILL, supra note 273, at 31-32.
278. Id. at 32.
279. HACKER, supra note 223, at 218.
280. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
281. Id.
282. Isaac Kramnik, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 21 (Isaac Kramnik ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
283. Id. at 21-22.
284. Id. at 21.
285. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 406 (discussing JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE
CONsTrrUTIONS (Boston Pub. 1788)).
286. U.S. CONsr. art. L § 9, cl. 8.
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tant to remove any notion of royalty.287 In 1784, John Adams attended a
production of The Marriage of Figaro at the Comedie-Francaise in
288
Paris. Adams undoubtedly appreciated Figaro's outburst in act V: "Be-
cause you are a great noble, you think you are a great genius! Nobility, a
fortune, a rank, appointments to office: all this makes a man so proud!
What did you do to earn all this? You took the trouble to get born-
nothing more.'2 8 9 Figaro spoke for the new nation.290 So did Senator
John Edwards 220 years later, accepting the vice presidential nomina-
tion: "[In America,] the family you're born into won't control your des-
tiny.' 291 People would be able to define themselves free from the heredi-
tary social compulsions of the old world.292
d. Constitutional Protections
The manifestation that most clearly establishes that making choices
free from government compulsion is a tradition deeply rooted in the na-
tion's history is the form of government the new nation chose. 29 3 The
framers formed a government in which power was highly diffused in
order to ensure against incursion of these rights.294 In Federalist 51,
James Madison wrote about the "double security" 295 of having "vertical
separation of powers between the nation and the states, along with the
horizontal separation of powers between the federal branches. 29 6 At-
tempts by one branch to invade the natural rights of people would be
checked by another.297 Restraints on the federal government were found
in the fact that it would have only those powers that were specifically
granted.298 Amendment IX stated that "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."2 99Amendment X stated that all powers that were
not mentioned were reserved for the people.30 0 Amendments I through IV
placed specific prohibitions on federal action.30 1 It is noteworthy that the
287. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 406. It is amusing to remember that when John Adams
suggested that the title of 'His Majesty the President,' Ralph lzard suggested the title of 'His Rotun-
dity' would be an appropriate sobriquet for Adams. Id.
288. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 307.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Senator John Edwards, Address at the Democratic Convention, July 2004 (transcript
available from the Kerry/Edwards campaign).
292. Kramnik, supra note 282, at 21.
293. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4 (offering an overview of the structures
of American government).
294. Id. at 85.




299. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
300. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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framers rejected a general grant of power as proposed (ironically) by the
Virginia delegation, reading:
That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the leg-
islative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and more-
over to legislate in all cases, to which the separate States are incom-
petent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by exercise of individual legislation.
30 2
Such a grant would be too easy to stretch, and the framers wanted the
limits clear.3 °3
Although states were given plenary powers, specific limits on state
power were found in Article I, section 10. 304 States would be barred from
"entering into treaties, coining money, granting titles of nobility, passing
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing contracts.' 3 5 States
would need congressional approval in order to "impose custom duties,
enter interstate compacts, or engage in war." 3°6 In addition, federalism
principles imposed other limits on state action, such as the dormant
commerce clause.
30 7
To be sure, there were heated differences in the framers' visions. °
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton had famous disagreements on
the strength of the federal government. Thomas Jefferson felt that the
security of people's rights lay in reserving power in the hands of the
populace.30 9 Alexander Hamilton had less confidence in the populace,
and felt that protection of people's rights lay in guarding against the
"twin specters of despotism and anarchy." 310 Yet when compared with
the world of George Il and Urban VIII, these differences seem to be of
degree rather than of kind.
In addition, the arguments were about means, not ends.31' Jefferson
felt that preserving liberties rested in a strong legislature. 31 2 Adams wrote
"people's rights and liberties... can never be preserved without a strong
executive. If the executive power, or any considerable part of it, is left in
the hands of an aristocratical or democratical assembly, it will corrupt the
legislature . . . and when the legislature is corrupted, people are un-
302. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 97.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 86.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 233.
308. Id. at 85.
309. See generally DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Little, Brown &
Co. 1951) (discussing Jefferson's views on liberty).
310. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (The Penguin Press 2004).
311. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 375.
312. See generally MALONE, supra note 309 (discussing Jefferson's views on liberty).
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done."313 (emphasis added.) Yet both were concerned about protecting
people's liberties. The common goal of the framers was ensuring the
inherent right of people to make decisions that "define one's own con-
cept of existence ' 14 free from government compulsion.315
It is, of course, too simple to write that the Old World was bad and
the New World was good.3 t6 The realities of European life that caused
the settlers to leave also gave rise to reform in Europe.317 The Age of
Enlightenment crossed the Atlantic; it is perhaps no coincidence that
Jefferson, Franklin, Voltaire and Mozart were contemporaries .318 In addi-
tion, the failings of American democracy fill volumes, and rightly so. Yet
the fact that a tradition is neither perfect nor exclusive does not deny its
reality.31 9 Making "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" is
the defining characteristic of the American experience, and is therefore
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
320
e. The American Tradition Applied to Same-Sex Marriage
Treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental right is in this
uniquely American tradition of letting people make "choices central to
321
personal dignity and autonomy" free from government compulsion.
Undoubtedly, some of the sources that may be used to sustain this argu-
ment would have been appalled to lend their name to the endeavor.322
Blackstone famously referred to sodomy as "a heinous act not fit to be
named., 32 3 Justice Harlan explicitly excluded homosexuality from pro-
324tection in Poe. But legal sources that acknowledge rights of freedoms
create a thing that is beyond their control.325 The fact that their ideas can
be used in ways of which they would not approve is perhaps the greatest
testament to their wisdom.326 It is no answer to say that same-sex couples
are free to be with each other, just not to marry.327 Being married
313. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258, at 375 (emphasis added).
314. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
315. See generally MCCULLOUGH, supra note 258 (offering an in depth discussion of the
attitudes and goals of the framers of the Constitution).




319. See generally Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing both discarded and
accepted traditions).
320. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (1977).
321. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951; see generally Feigen, supra note 53 (advocating a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage).
322. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1894.
323. Id.
324. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Thus, I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication, and incest are immune from criminal inquiry ....").
325. See generally Tribe, supra note 33 (discussing the meaning of freedom as it related to a
fundamental rights analysis); see generally Loewy, supra note 108 (arguing that same-sex marriage
is consistent with American notions of freedom).
326. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
327. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
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changes how people view themselves, their relationship to each other,
and their relationship as to the rest of the world.328 To deny a marriage
license is to shape an identity.
329
Without a doubt, broad views of liberty need limiting principles.
330
In a sense, every action we take in life defines our meaning of existence;
laws against drunk driving need not be judged by strict scrutiny because
they might compel a person's identity.331 But experience and instinct tell
us that the thoughts we have, the words that we speak, the God to whom
we pray, and the people we choose to love and cast our lot in life with
surely are among the "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
[that] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ,332
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Accordingly, same-sex marriage should be viewed as a fundamental
right.333 However, that does not decide the question in and of itself.334 A
fundamental right is not an absolute right; its presence merely determines
the proper standard of review.335 Justice Cordy worried that allowing
same-sex marriage would open the floodgates: "If one assumes that a
group of mature, consenting, committed adults can form a marriage, the
prohibition on polygamy (G.L. c. 207, § 4), infringes on their right to
marry [and a law prohibiting it would not be allowed].",336 It would in-
fringe on their right; laws against the marriage of siblings or minors in-
fringe on their rights as well, but are constitutional. 7 Strict scrutiny does
not command that a right may not be infringed, just that it may only be
infringed for a compelling reason.338
If strict scrutiny is applied to same-sex marriage, some of the ra-
tionales clearly fail. 339 If the rationale is "providing a favorable setting
for procreation" then the law is both under- and over-inclusive; some
people who have children are not married, and not all married couples
328. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
329. See generally Tribe, supra note 33; Loewy, supra note 108.
330. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127.
331. Id.
332. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (1992); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
333. See generally Loewy, supra note 108 (arguing that same-sex marriage is a fundamental
right).
334. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
335. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
336. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 984 n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
337. Id.; Strasser, supra note 155, at 32; Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
338. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring); Strasser, supra note 155, at 329;
Wardle, supra note 60, at 60.
339. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996, 1004 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Loewy, supra note 108,
at 558.
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have children.34° The rationale of "preserving scarce State and private
financial resources" fails for the same reason; not all married couples are
a drain on the state budget, and some single people are such a drain.34'
Other rationales take more careful consideration.34z The rationale of
"ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing" is perhaps the most im-
portant and controversial.343 As Justice Sosman indicated, we are for all
practical purposes in the first generation of same-sex couples raising
children.344 Although there are adamant beliefs on both sides, the effect
on these children as they mature into adults is still by definition un-
known.345 Perhaps in the end, the constitutionality of a law prohibiting
same-sex marriage will turn on the answer.346 But the time to admit that
the plaintiffs in Goodridge deserve the strict constitutional protection of
a fundamental right is now.
347
CONCLUSION
There is a natural tension between two truths in American life. 48
Law is by definition a conservative institution; it necessarily relies on
precedent, history and tradition, so that people can know what it is and
understand its meaning.3 49 The law does not easily accept change.350
But the story of constitutional rights is the story of change.35' In
United States v. Virginia,352 Justice Ginsburg quoted the historian Rich-
ard Morris: "A prime part of the history of our Constitution is the story
of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once
ignored or excluded. 353 Condoleezza Rice has said that "when the fram-
ers wrote the Constitution, they didn't mean me. 354 Today we mean
her.
355
340. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996, 1004 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
341. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
342. Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
343. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; see generally Culhane, supra note 175, at 1194 (discussing the
impact of same-sex marriage on children).
344. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting); id. at 996 (Cordy, J., dissenting);
see Duncan, supra note 146, at 164; see generally Culhane, supra note 175 at 1194.
345. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 978 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
346. Id.
347. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1951; see generally Feigen, supra note 53 (advocating a constitu-
tional right to same-sex marriage).
348. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 990, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
349. Goodridge, 798 N.E. at 990, 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Cordy, J., dissenting).
351. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
352. 518 U.S. 515.
353. Loewy, supra note 108, at 556 (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557).
354. Testimony of Condoleezza Rice before the 9/11 Commission (April 8, 2004) (transcript
available from New York Times).
355. Id.
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If, in the search for fundamental rights, one looks to specific past
traditions rather than principles, constitutional rights would never have
been expanded.356 In 1865 there was no tradition of free African-
Americans in the south. In 1955 there was no tradition of inter-racial
seating on buses and in theatres. In 1975 (in a battle that is still not won)
there was no tradition of women getting paid as much as men. Today
there is no tradition of same-sex marriage. To insist on looking at yester-
day to see who needs protection today is to ensure a static society.357
The answer to the fundamental rights question left unresolved in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health will be found in this ten-
sion.35s All of American history points towards answering the question in
favor of the Goodridge plaintiffs. 359 The individual cases that make up
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence for fundamental rights are bright stars
indeed. 360 These cases have recognized protection for one's body361 and
mind,362 the right to travel,363 to marry, 364 to vote, 365 and the right to pri-
vacy.366 Yet it is the constellation that these stars combine to create that
has lit American history.367 When one considers "the traditions from
which [America] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke, ' 368 Justice O'Connor's idea that we have the inherent right to con-
trol "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy" 369 free from gov-
ernment compulsion is not an American tradition, it is the American tra-
dition. 370 Viewed as such, treating same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right is simply one more contiguous chapter in the American story.371
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts chose to sidestep the
issue of fundamental rights.372 As such, it put off the real question for
another court and another day. 373 Yet, by properly holding for the plain-
tiffs, the Goodridge court forces us to address issues that "constitute the
356. See generally Tribe, supra note 33 (arguing against viewing fundamental rights as a set of
specific acts).
357. Id.
358. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990, 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see Culhane, supra note 175.
359. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
360. Id.
361. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
362. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
363. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
364. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
365. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
366. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (1973).
367. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
368. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
369. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see generally Tribe, supra note
33 (discussing the meaning of freedom as it relates to a fundamental rights analysis).
370. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1937.
371. Id.
372. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 990, 1003.
373. Id.
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essential core of constitutionalism and the cornerstone of American lib-
erty. 374 That is no small accomplishment.375
James Hart*
374. Tribe, supra note 33, at 1899.
375. Id.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to the mem-
ory of his grandparents, Justice James P. Hart and Katherine Drake Hart.

